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PARADOX AND ARGUMENTATION
FROM RHETORIC TO THE REFINEMENT OF MATHEMATICS
SebaStià Serrano
Paradoxes – and the problem they present for logic – can be traced as a subject for reflection from 
the Sophists to contemporary language philosophers and mathematicians, visiting Aristotle, Abel 
and Russell along the way, during which time rhetorical algebra transitioned into syncopated algebra 
and then to symbolic algebra. The paradox can be seen as an obstacle to aseptic reasoning, but it can 
also act as a compelling stimulus for imagination and the practice of argumentation or persuasion, 
a rhetorical tool that has encouraged rigorous thinking throughout history, in an attempt to avoid 
«concealed» lies in all kinds of discourses. It is, therefore, a challenge that inspires creativity within a 








Twenty-five centuries ago in Greece, an absolutely 
transcendent event boosted the development of 
culture and, therefore, our species. Decisive events, 
including a favourable socio-political and economic 
context related to the advent of democracy, brought 
philosophical thinking about reality, the world and 
self – the same thing really – to 
language. We should remember 
that all previous philosophy, 
from Tales to Parmenides, had 
focused on the world and nature 
and aimed to understand natural 
phenomena. However, sophists 
placed language at the centre 
of their thinking. They studied 
discursive and communicative 
strategies in order to instruct in 
the art of communication. From 
that time on, a large proportion 
of Greek philosophy was the 
philosophy of language, whether 
in the form of rhetoric, logic, poetics or grammar 
(Serrano, 1996; Vega Reñón & Olmos González, 
2011). Plato and Aristotle are its synthesizers.
With the advent of democracy, in the Greek 
tradition, we find an interest in and a taste for 
argumentation, dialectics and discourses constructed 
with the aim of being persuasive. In time, it was 
recognised that the ability to persuade granted 
unquestionable power: the power of having words 
without objects, of affecting people through words, 
through discourse. In such a society, where certain 
classes had agreed to democratic life, argumentation 
and public debate were important and common in the 
Agora and in the courts of justice. A good education 
was fundamental. One of the most common discursive 
strategies used to succeed in 
debates was, for instance, using 
your opponent’s premises to 
reach an impossibility as a 
logical consequence.
Aristotle named Zeno of Elea 
and Socrates as the masters of 
this strategy. At that time, when 
argumentation was principal, 
several fallacies started to appear 
that forced people to reflect upon 
the general criteria that should 
characterise good reasoning. 
For instance, a debate along the 
lines of «This dog is a father. 
This dog belongs to its owner. Therefore, this dog is 
the father of his owner». Clearly, this is a deceptive 
reasoning process, although it follows a strictly 
correct reasoning structure. Another example of this 
structure is «this object is a box, this object is blue, so 
this object is a blue box». These examples, selected 
from important debates of the time, were the subject 
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of reflection for Aristotle in his 
research on the fundamental laws 
of the art of good reasoning. In 
addition, Aristotle also reflected 
upon the arguments of geometrists 
attempting to discover the art 
of deduction, of demonstration, 
in order to overcome the long 
crisis related to irrational and 
infinitesimal numbers. Zeno’s 
paradox, with Achilles and the 
tortoise, was the focus of many 
debates. The story goes like this: 
«Swift-footed» Achilles races against a tortoise and 
gives the animal a head start. When the warrior reaches 
the point where the tortoise was, it has already walked 
a little bit farther, so Achilles needs to run a little more 
to cover that distance, but while he does that, the turtle 
will have walked a bit more, and so on. Therefore, from 
a mathematical point of view – and against empirical 
evidence – the swift-footed runner would never cover 
the distance that separates him from the slow animal. 
Certainly, reflection on the validity of argumentation 
must have become almost obsessive, as it was the axial 
point for both geometrical and rhetorical discourse, 
the latter being, to a certain degree, the mother of all 
discourses. This is the reason for Aristotle’s interest in 
developing a kind of «taxonomy» of argumentation, that 
is, a systematic classification that he called syllogistic, 
with different types of syllogisms that opposed the 
rhetorical syllogism. The framing of syllogistic modes 
did not have the flexibility required for most of the 
arguments used in geometry or in the Agora. That 
is why some schools, such as 
Stoics or Megarians, formulated 
alternative non-syllogistic logical 
structures that allowed them to 
operate with more flexibility and 
fluidity. A good example were the 
two inference rules called modus 
ponens – that is, «if p then q; we 
assert p, therefore q» – and modus 
tollens – «if p, then q; so no q, then 
no p».
Of course, since Plato, the 
validity of an argument had to 
be linked to the concept of truth, and that led to the 
proliferation of a fascinating linguistic, logical and 
mathematical phenomenon, those famous paradoxes 
that sprang like mushrooms after rain on the field of 
discourse. In this way, the Greeks formulated some 
of the enigmas and logical puzzles that have tortured 
mathematicians, philosophers and rhetorical experts to 
this day. Sophists specialised in stunning and confusing 
their opponents during debates – often as purely 
rhetorical exercises in the arena of public speaking –, 
although most of them just wanted to stand out in the 
swampy discourse of dialectical tricks.
There was a group of disturbing and perplexing 
enigmas that stubbornly resisted all sorts of inquiries. 
Most originate from what we know as «vicious circle 
fallacies», caused by neglecting the fundamental 
principle that implies that the whole of a given totality 
cannot be part of the totality. For example, the well-
known barber paradox has come to us from medieval 
logic. This states that the town’s barber shaves everyone 
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except those who shave themselves. So, does the 
barber need to shave himself? If he does, he is shaving 
someone who shaves himself and breaks his own rule. 
If he does not, he will not be shaven and will break the 
rule because he is not shaving someone who does not 
shave himself.
Another substantial part of these enigmas is 
connected to the tradition of the liar’s paradox, also 
known as the paradox created by Epimenides of 
Knossos, which immortalised the statement: «All 
Cretans are liars», with the variations «I am lying» 
or «This sentence is false». Note that it is a statement 
that drastically contradicts the universally accepted 
dichotomy between true and false statements. If I say 
«What I’m saying is false», what I say cannot be true, 
because then it would be false. And it cannot be false, 
because then it would be true. It is neither true nor false, 
or it is both. Or better still, it is true if it is false, and 
it is false if it is true. The discovery of this circularity, 
almost distressing, contradictory and inconceivable, 
does not have to stop language and social life as result 
of a fascinating collision. A similar thing can occur 
when we discuss topics such as «natural selection» in 
biology. Thus, natural selection selects the fittest. But, 
who is the fittest? The one that gets selected by natural 
selection... However, disappointment, desolation and 
even grief – I am thinking of the letter Gottlob Frege 
received from Bertrand Russell – starts when one tries 
to construct a continuous logical structure into which 
mathematics should fit. 
The liar’s paradox circulates through every school 
of logic from the Middle Ages to the modern world. 























can be summed up more or less as follows: hunting in 
the prince’s lands was punishable by death. However, 
it occurred to him to decree that «anyone who was 
caught hunting would be offered the privilege to 
choose if he would be hanged or beheaded. The 
accused would utter a sentence; if it were false, 
he would be hanged, if it were true, he would be 
beheaded. A very spirited and logical boy took 
advantage of this prerogative when he stated: «You 
shall hang me». They had not taken this dilemma into 
account, and he blurted out his elegant reasoning: 
«If you hang me you will break the prince’s law, as I 
should be beheaded for telling the truth, and if you 
behead me you will also break the law, because if 
you do, what I have just said is false, so I should be 
hanged». In my book La Paradoxa (“The Paradox”) 
(Serrano, 1985), I collect – and construct – many 
examples of the liar’s paradox. Incidentally, we can 
find a variant of it in Don Quixote. Sancho Panza is 
faced with it when he is the governor of the island 
of Barataria and has to decide 
whether or not he should 
condemn a prisoner who poses 
a similar paradox. He solves 
it in a practical way, applying 
the principle of favouring the 
prisoner in a case of doubt. 
n	THE	DEVELOPMENT	OF	
ALGEBRA
An enigmatic epitaph is written 
on the tomb guarding the ashes of the mathematician 
Diophantus, who lived in Alexandria during the third 
century. It informs us that his childhood amounted to 
a sixth of his life, that his beard grew for one twelfth 
more, and «the flame of marriage was burning» for 
an additional one seventh. Five years later his son was 
born, he lived for only half of his father’s life, who 
lived for four more years after the death of the child, 
in a grief only alleviated by «research in the art of 
numbers». Today, it is very easy to solve this riddle. If 
x is the age at which Diophantus died, then: 
 x  +   x  +  x  + 5 +  x  + 4 = x
 6       12     7                 2
Therefore, the great Diophantus lived for 84 years.
The study of how to formulate mathematical 
statements, the process of symbolisation and 
formalisation, represents one of the most impressive 
methodological and epistemological efforts of the 
human mind, which helps us to generate the most 
sophisticated formalisms opening the doors to 
artificial intelligence. Today, as 
we saw in the simple equation 
about Diophantus’s age, the 
solution is almost immediate. 
However, the problem of 
notation of Greek geometrical 
or arithmetical formulations 
was already considerable. Many 
of the modern formulations 
are the result of transcribing 
the Greek ones, originally 
presented in different ways via ordinary language, 
using words with a broad semantic spectrum. In 
fact, good notations are absent until the work of 
mathematician François Viète is published in the late 
sixteenth century; and the algebraic formulation we 
recognise is not commonplace until the middle of the 
seventeenth century, and even then, it is reminiscent 
of ordinary language. This has led algebra scholars to 
establish a distinction, in stages, between rhetorical 
algebra, syncopated algebra and symbolic algebra.
The arithmetic of Diophantus, and a good portion 
of Greek mathematics, reappears in the ninth century 
translated and assimilated into and discussed in 
Arabic. The first algebraic treatise by Al-Khwarizmi 
also appeared in the early ninth century. For a long 
time, algebra was considered the science of equations. 
All of these Arabic treatises, translations and reviews 
were brought to the Western world in the early 
seventeenth century by the mathematician Fibonacci. 
Fibonacci made a case for the Hindu-Arabic numeral 
system, which we still use today. He taught number 
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literacy and informed about the rules of calculus, 
operation between numbers, integers and fractions, the 
extraction of square roots and, especially, methods and 
algorithms to solve first and second degree equations. 
He did so with an exquisite model for the theory or 
argumentation, which is, after 
all – as Aristotle claimed – the 
tabernacle of rhetoric.
Once algebra is established, 
the race begins to solve cubic 
equations, and then quartic 
ones. Solving an equation meant 
determining the value of the 
variable using calculus – an 
algorithm – that affected only the 
coefficients that accompanied 
the variable in their different 
degrees. In the sixteenth century, 
Gerolamo Cardano and Niccolò Fontana (also known 
as «Tartaglia», which means “stutterer”) found the 
solution for the cubic equation ax3+bx2+cx+d=0. One 
of Cardano’s disciples, Lodovico Ferrari, solved 
quartic equations at the end of the century. The 
enormous efforts of the most famous algebra scholars 
encountered a great obstacle, a critical point, in solving 
the quintic equation, until, in 1826, mathematician 
Niels Henrik Abel managed to prove the impossibility 
of solving it – or any further degree equations – by 
the usual means. A complete frustration for the great 
mathematical brains.
However, Niels Henrik Abel introduced a different 
approach to an algebra problem. For the first time, 
he asked: What is solving a problem? He designed a 
programme on procedures to solve 
a problem and how to formulate 
these procedures. It was a true 
reflection on the discourse of 
problem solving and how we 
could create a standard – in our 
language – for these procedures 
and algorithms, how we could 
formalise them and, even, 
automatise them. This shows 
another side to the theory of 
demonstration and the theory of 
argumentation. Logic and the core 
of rhetoric configured simultaneously.
n CONTEMPORARY	LOGIC	AND	MATHEMATICS
Around 1885, the German mathematician Georg 
Cantor formulated a compelling and powerful 
theory that would greatly challenge intuition – the 
famous set theory. The impact on the field of logic 
and mathematics was huge. Many thought it could 
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of mathematics. Soon, as prominent a logician as 
Frege ventured into the quest for a foundation for 
arithmetic, based on set theory, a challenge which he 
tackled for a long time. When he finished, he sent the 
result – the foundation of arithmetic – to some of the 
most qualified mathematicians of the time. He sent 
it to Russell, who answered with a letter that Frege 
would not wish upon his worst enemy. Indeed, Russell 
detected a number of paradoxes that appeared in 
Frege’s system and weakened the whole theory.
Russell reminds him of a paradox – known 
as Russell’s paradox –, which in Kurt Grelling’s 
formulation goes approximately as follows: we will 
divide all the predicates into two categories (sets), those 
which can be their own predicate, such as polysyllabic, 
which is, indeed, a polysyllabic word, or English, which 
is, indeed, an English word (because polysyllabic 
has several syllables and English is a lexical unit that 
can be found in an English dictionary). We call these 
predicates and the set containing them autological. On 
the other hand, those that cannot be their own predicate 
will be heterological. This is the case with monosyllabic 
or Spanish, because the first word is not a monosyllable 
and the second word is not in 
Spanish. The big question concerns 
the heterological predicate. What 
is it, heterological or autological? 
Which set does it belong to? It can 
only fit one of them. But, if it is 
autological, then it is heterological, 
and if it is heterological, then it 
is autological. In other words, it 
can only be autological when it 
is heterological, and vice versa. 
And it can only belong to the 
autological set if it does not. «Oh, 
my God!», Frege would exclaim. 
Thus, the Aristotelian principle of 
the excluded middle was broken (it is alive or dead: A is 
B or not B, there is no intermediate possibilities). This 
fact shook the foundation of the theory. 
Self-reference is the root of all evil, the oxygen 
that fuels the flame. The paradox lies in the fact that 
the formulation affects the formulation. Saying «this 
statement is false» is metalanguage; language about 
language, so Russell’s «paradoxical» set is nothing 
more than the result of neglecting the differentiation 
between a set and a metaset, a set of sets. The problem 
was the mixture of levels, of types, as Russell would 
say. The solution lies in having sufficiently demarcated 
boundaries and types, differentiating clearly between 
levels of abstraction. So the rules of Bertrand Russell 
and Alfred North Whitehead’s monumental Principia 
mathematica do not allow the 
closed system of reversible 
feedback, which was like a dog 
chasing its tail and opening the 
door to self-contradiction. In 
fact, they created a firewall that 
prevented the vice of circularity in 
reasoning. Reminiscences of the 
liar’s paradox finally disappeared. 
It appeared that everything was 
perfect in the world of logic. 
During the first decade of the 
twentieth century, Hilbert worried 
about the perceptible crisis at 
the core of mathematics due to paradoxes, so he urged 
mathematicians to organise Cantor’s set theory on a 
solid axiomatic foundation – like Russell – consisting 
of a limited number of postulates. This marked an 
important shift towards an emphasis on mathematical 
abstraction. Mathematicians increasingly moved further 
away from «intuitive content», corresponding in this 
case to surfaces or lines towards a situation where 
mathematical concepts are free from their direct content 
and are simply defined axiomatically within a context, a 
frame, a theory.
The age of formalism had arrived and they 
could refer to numbers, straight lines or clouds or 
broken hearts. This formalism promoted the use 
of mathematics to solve problems that had been 
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considered impossible to submit to highly formalised 
treatment. David Hilbert, André Weil and subsequently 
John Von Neumann, had considerable success in 
extending the axiomatic approach to a number of new 
problems: perhaps the most emblematic in the new 
physics, such as quantum mechanics, but also logic 
or the new game theory. Mathematics had become 
more than a profession, it was a wonderfully dynamic 
adventure. With Alan Turing, Claude Shannon or 
Norbert Wiener, a fantastic idea started to crystallise: 
that the human mind could achieve anything with 
mathematical ideas. We should find this intellectually 
fascinating and aesthetically pleasing. Yes, and many 
advances in mathematics were made thanks to the 
observation of unsuspected relationships between 
objects that seemed intractable and other objects that 
mathematicians had already mastered.
However, at a time of great mathematical optimism, 
Kurt Gödel proved his incompleteness theorem and 
spoiled Hilbert and Russell’s optimism (Hofstadter, 
1979). Paradoxes were alive and well! With a flawless 
logical exercise, the most brilliant, difficult and 
surprising in modern logic, Gödel’s showed that the 
formal axiomatic method that had served mathematics 
for so long and so well, also had some limitations. In 
a way, he told us that formal deduction had, in part, 
refuted itself. However, as Ernest Nagel and James R. 
Newman communicated in their famous work Gödel’s 
Proof (Nagel & Newman, 1970), this was not a reason 
to despair, quite the contrary, in fact, it justified «a 
renewed appreciation of the powers of creative reason».
We believe that paradoxes, which started as a thorn 
in the side of good reasoning, of valid argumentation 
in the Agora and in primitive logical and mathematical 
discourse, have become a reference point to support 
the discourse of rigour and clarity, where «concealed 
information» that can cause a contradiction has no 
place. However, the butterfly of paradox continues to 
fly within the universe of discourse, as one of the most 
successful examples of creativity in cultural spaces. 
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From	left	to	right,	pictures	of	Georg	Cantor,	Bertrand	Russell,	John	Von	Neumann,	Norbert	Wiener	and	Kurt	Gödel.	The	work	of	these	
authors,	among	others,	was	crucial	for	the	development	of	contemporary	logic	and	mathematics.
